RISK: Health, Safety & Environment (1990-2002)
Volume 4
Number 2 RISK: Issues in Health & Safety

Article 6

March 1993

Consensus Development at NIH: What Went Wrong
Itzhak Jacoby

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.unh.edu/risk
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Health Policy Commons

Repository Citation
Itzhak Jacoby, Consensus Development at NIH: What Went Wrong , 4 RISK 133 (1993).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of New Hampshire – Franklin Pierce School
of Law at University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in RISK: Health,
Safety & Environment (1990-2002) by an authorized editor of University of New Hampshire Scholars' Repository.
For more information, please contact ellen.phillips@law.unh.edu.

Consensus Development at NIH:

What Went Wrong?
Itzhak Jacoby*
Introduction
Shortly after the Science Court first received national attention, thendirector of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) Dr. Donald F.
Fredrickson conceived of a program of consensus development with it
as a model. 1 Since then, the NIH program has sponsored more than
100 consensus development conferences to clarify issues involving
application of medical technology to clinical practice. Having outlived
the Science Court and other similar efforts, the NIH program represents
the most visible federally-mediated medical technology assessment
activity in existence. Its principles and procedures have been studied and
emulated within the U.S. and by many other countries that support
consensus development programs. 2 Nevertheless, weaknesses in the
NIl program can be traced to early decisions not to adopt certain
aspects of the original Science Court concept.
First, the NIH program has chosen not to use adversary procedures,
particularly cross examination of expert witnesses, that could have
assured a more orderly and thorough airing of the facts on both sides of
the argument and produced stronger conclusions. Second, the NIH is
both the sponsor and the recipient of the results of the consensus
process, violating the Science Court's principle not to accept funding
from an agency that is party to a policy dispute. 3 This principle was to
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1 See, e.g., Before the Health Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). (testimony of Donald S. Fredrickson)
2 See, e.g., J. Lomas et al., The Role of Evidence in the Consensus Process:
Resultsfrom A CanadianConsensus Exercise, 259 JAMA 3001 (1988).
3 Task Force of the Presidential Advisory Group on Anticipated Advances in
Science and Technology, The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report,
reprinted infra, at 179.
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assure that considerations of the acceptability of the ruling to that agency
would not contaminate the deliberations; that is, the participants should
feel that there are "no strings attached." Third, in contrast to the primary
aim of the Science Court model, the consensus process rarely debates a
pending governmental policy decision in collaboration with another
agency, even though doing so would help ensure the significance and
timeliness of the results. NIH conferences instead focus on producing
recommendations to guide decision making by practitioners, not external
policy-makers, even though the guidance is often transformed de facto
into policy by its application to reimbursement decisions. It is therefore
somewhat ironic that the NIH selects topics and participants for its
conferences without the broad participation of the very parties it aims to
serve, contrary to what the Science Court architects prescribed. The
NIH consensus development process therefore suffers from an
insularity that raises questions about possible bias in its judgments and
damages the effectiveness of its consensus program.
Evolution of the Process
The consensus development process matured in the 1980's, during
an unprecedented proliferation of emerging medical technologies. There
was an urgent need for knowledgeable, impartial scientists to scrutinize
the safety and efficacy of new technologies and arrive at policy
decisions regarding their readiness for adoption in clinical practice.
Many of the emerging procedures promised great advances in diagnosis
and treatment but were seen by some to remain too long in investigative
circles. The consensus program therefore aimed initially to encourage
the adoption of new procedures, provided they were found to be safe
and effective and incorporated means for wide dissemination of the
conference deliberations. As Fredrickson then informed the Senate
4
Subcommittee on Health:
It seems clear that in the future, the NIH and the rest of
the scientific community must assume more responsibility
for the effect of research on the quality of the health care
delivered. The need for accelerating the transfer of new
technology across the "interface" between biomedical
research and the health care community and systems is a
major issue.
4

Supra note 1.
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At the same time, concerns about the impact of expensive
technologic innovations on escalating health care costs brought
pressures from many sources, including Congress, to stem the flow of
ineffective technologies and bring an end to outdated practices. Almost
from the beginning, therefore, the program focused both on new
technologies and reexamination of existing clinical practice; existing
practices are considered when there is new scientific information
concerning their use. Further, the evolution of the program was fostered
by the enactment of prospective payment legislation for Medicare in
1983: For a technology to be reimbursable, it had to be established as
safe and effective as well as cost-effective compared to alternatives.
Submitting new technologies to careful assessment thus became a
necessary component of the practice of medicine. 5
After an initial five-year period of experimentation, NIH codified the
format and procedure for its consensus conferences. These guidelines
have remained stable over the past 10 years. Planning a conference takes
from 12 to 15 months, during which the NIH selects a topic, forms a
planning committee, invites participants, and analyzes supporting data.
The planning committee, consisting of NIH staff, non-NIH experts in
the field of discussion, and the prospective conference chair, defines the
scope and focus of the conference by drafting specific questions related
to the safety and efficacy of the technologies being assessed. The
planning committee also selects the speakers and panelists. At the
conference, speakers supply the evidence, which is evaluated by the
consensus panel.
The panel responds to the questions posed by the planning
committee in a consensus statement that reflects its assessment of the
evidence. The 10 to 15 panel members include basic researchers, clinical
practitioners, methodologists (epidemiologists and biostatisticians), and
public representatives, none of whom are supposed to hold an advocacy
position on the topic of the conference. Except for the conference chair,
the groups - planning committee, speakers and panel - responsible
for the final consensus product share no common membership.
The conferences begin with a day-and-a-half plenary session with
public discussions among speakers, panelists, and members of the
5 Fitzhugh Mullan & Itzhak Jacoby, The Town Meeting for Technology: The
Maturationof Consensus Conferences, 254 JAMA 8 (1985).
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audience. On the afternoon and evening of the second day, the panel
drafts the consensus statement in executive session. The panel presents
the draft statement to the audience on the morning of the third day and
invites comment and discussion from the audience. The panel may later
incorporate comments it receives into its final consensus statement. The
conference concludes with a press conference and usually generates
extensive coverage, including publication of the consensus statement in
medical and specialty journals as well as summaries in the lay media.
The duration of deliberations, roles of participants, processes for
selecting issues and participants and participants' roles all distinguish
the NIH process from that proposed for the Science Court. These
differences have had a major impact on the outcome of the NIH process.
Issue Selection
Both the Science Court and NIH consensus development models
were designed to resolve a scientific controversy with policy
implications. Both models therefore developed criteria for selecting from
among numerous candidate issues. In the NIH process, topics proposed
for evaluation involve a gap between knowledge and clinical practice.
Relevance of issues is based upon their medical importance, which
involves the number of people affected and cost implications. There
must be a scientific debate about the use of the technology and a
discrepancy between the available knowledge and its practical
application in medicine. Most important, there must be an available base
of scientific information about the technology to support an empirical
discussion of its merits.
In the Science Court model, persons outside of government agencies
would choose cases from among topics proposed by those agencies.
This model prohibits, as previously mentioned, agencies from funding
adjudication of their own policy issues. In the NIH program, the topic
selection is performed internally. While the primary audience for the
process is acknowledged by its own guidelines to be the community of
medical practitioners, neither this community nor other organizations
that depend upon the results of the consensus process for guidance are
typically involved in topic selection. For example, the process rarely
involves physician specialty societies or payer organizations which
might help identify the most urgently needed consensus development
issues. In fact, since NIH neither regulates science policy nor clinical
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practice, the assessments being made more properly involve policy
decisions of other agencies, like the Health Care Financing
Administration, which reimburses providers and beneficiaries with
government funds. As a result, NIH conferences often fail to match
topic selection with the clinical community's need for guidance and the
6
availability of evidence necessary for developing a consensus.
The atypical, and controversial, 1983 conference on Liver
Transplantation exemplifies the use of this process to arrive at a policy
decision through debate on the evidence. The conference was stimulated
by Medicare's need for guidance on coverage, assuring the timeliness of
the assessment. The evidence was carefully analyzed and presented to
the panelists well before the conference was held. Both sides of the
argument were well represented, and the debate was focused. The
conference attracted intense political and public attention. Medicare's
decision to provide coverage for liver transplantation, which followed
soon after the consensus statement was issued, can be linked directly to
the recommendations of the conference. This felicitous joining of need
and response has unfortunately been the exception.
Although the broad goal of the consensus development program is
to facilitate the appropriate and timely application of biomedical research
results to clinical practice, NIH tends to select topics circumscribed by
the agency's biomedical research interests. For example, many of the
conferences examine biomedical technologies like computerized axial
tomographic (CAT) scanning, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI),
endoscopy (the subject of two conferences), and the use of
microprocessor-based "intelligent" machines in patient care. Such
conferences have been criticized for not meriting the rigorous evaluation
or expenditure associated with the program because they lack
controversy and serve largely to promote the agency's desire to
encourage the diffusion of emerging technology and justify further
research. 7 These shortcomings contributed to producing the
unremarkable findings of the 1984 conference on diagnostic ultrasound
imaging in pregnancy. This conference can be contrasted with an earlier
one on cesarean childbirth, sponsored with the active involvement of the
6 Jacqueline Kosecoff et al., Effects of the National Institutes of Health
Consensus Development Programon PhysicianPractice,258 JAMA 19 (1987).

7

Drummond Rennie, Consensus Statements, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED. 665 (1981).
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clinical community, which tackled a controversial issue in the
appropriate forum and produced valuable recommendations.
The program's unwillingness to assess the current state of clinical
practice along with the current state of science when considering
potential conference topics also contributes to poor timing of results.
Since CAT scanning technology was already well diffused and its
pattern of utilization established before the 1981 conference on CAT
scanning was held, the results came too late to influence clinical
practice. The outcome of consensus conferences on breast cancer held in
1979 and 1980, which considered uses for procedures - like radical
mastectomy for management of local disease - that were already
discredited by clinicians, also typified the problem of widespread
preconference conformity to its recommendations.
As further indication of its detachment from policy concerns, NIH
limits the scope of inquiry of its conferences to evaluation of safety and
efficacy, even though these factors provide only part of the information
needed by health care professionals, patients, third-party payers, and
other decision makers. To be effective in improving health care practice,
health technology assessments must also address relevant economic,
social, and ethical consequences, such as cost, access, and quality of
life. The results of the 1987 conference on MRI generated only limited
interest because they focused on safety and efficacy instead of issues of
cost-effectiveness that concerned policy-makers. Similarly, the 1984
conference on Limb-Sparing Treatment of Adult Soft-Tissue and
Osteosarcomas lost much relevance by exploring issues related to
preventing disease recurrence while resolutely avoiding discussion of an
issue of great importance to patients - the impact of alternative
treatment on the quality of life of amputees.
Selection of Advocates
In the Science Court model, issue selection was followed by
identification of adversarial "case managers" for each side. This
selection process would have involved broad advertisement for
proposals to demonstrate the respondent's credentials to represent one
side of the issue. The respondent was envisioned to be an interest group
or any consortium of groups and individuals with the requisite expertise
and constituency. The Science Court and/or the collaborating agency

Jacoby: What Went Wrong at NIH? 139
8
were expected to participate in the selection of case managers.
There is no comparable selection process or analogous case
management function in the NIH consensus development program. The
speakers invited to present at the consensus conferences come closest to
functioning as the advocates of the Science Court. These speakers give
expert testimony and may advocate strong and sometimes contrary
points of view. The speakers, however, have no formal role to defend a
given position in opposition to proponents of an opposing view. Nor do
they question the statements of other speakers, as advocates of the
Science Court concept would have done. Rather, the NIH program
tends to invite speakers from the biomedical research community who
present in a manner resembling a scientific meeting. Unfortunately, the
program often fails to invite researchers and analysts with relevant data
from other sources, such as clinical practice.

Selection of Judges and Referees
The Science Court method for selecting judges and referees included
consultation with appropriate scientific societies and organizations to
assure unusual scientific capability and no obvious connection to the
disputed issue. As a further check, the case managers were to examine
proposed names for prejudice. A referee, or chief judge advised by legal
counsel, concerned with implementing procedures was also proposed to
enable full control by the scientific community.
In the NIH process, the panel undertakes the role of the judges and
the panel chair assumes the role of chief judge and referee. Panel
members, although possessing collective expertise on the topic being
discussed, are expected to arrive with an open mind and listen
impartially to the scientific data presented by the speakers. These key
appointments are made by the conference planning committee with
minimal input from organizations or individuals interested in the
consensus topic. In the absence of case managers or other systematic
control of the presentation of evidence, the panel chair becomes a critical
figure. The individual selected can control the objectivity of the process,
questioning of speakers, comments from the audience, synthesis of
data, and development of the consensus statement. The success of the
process can therefore hinge on the prestige, knowledge, impartiality,
leadership, and group process skills of the chair. This betrays several
8
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inadequacies of the consensus development process. In several
conferences, the chairs were performing research on the topic being
discussed or held an advocacy position on the issue and could not have
been considered impartial.
Presentation of Facts, Challenges
and Adversary Procedures
In the Science Court procedure, case managers individually were to
reduce all aspects of the issue to statements of scientific fact which the
referee or judges would have reviewed before allowing mutual scrutiny
of the statements by case managers for the opposing view. The case
managers either would have accepted or challenged one another's
statements. Challenged statements first would have been subjected to a'
mediation process to produce consensus between the parties; if this
fails, the statements would have become the focus of an adversary
procedure. The intended challenge resolution procedure involved both
oral and written presentations, in an effort to produce statements of the
highest possible validity in the given time constraints. While some
aspects of this process were negotiable, there was no question that the
right of each case manager to cross examine the positions taken by his
or her adversary would be preserved.
In the NIH consensus process, the speakers present in a collegial
manner comparable to a scientific conference. There is little effort made
to organize the data presented by the speakers or to align participants
into opposing positions. In the 1985 meeting on adjuvant chemotherapy
of breast cancer, the pro-chemotherapy viewpoint was well-represented
while the opposing view was not. The 1984 conference on lowering
blood cholesterol to prevent heart disease also promoted cholesterol
lowering with inadequate representation of opposing views. The lack of
confrontation damaged the credibility of the predictable
recommendations. There is also no provision for speakers to challenge
each other's findings or ask for clarification. Questions for the speakers
come from the Panel or audience and vary in their degree of probing.
Since there is never adequate time for audience members to comment or
ask questions, the entire responsibility for evaluating and reconciling the
sometimes conflicting data, as well as translating it into a consensus
statement, falls to the panel. Depending upon the extent to which
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speakers provide their presentations in advance or NIH staff provide the
panel with a synthesis of the evidence before the meeting, much of this
integration takes place at the conference.
There is an obvious risk that the speaker's manner of presentation or
the availability of certain kinds of expertise on the panel will cause great
variation in the results of the data evaluation. Also, the task may prove
unworkable in the time available, causing the panel to compromise its
evaluation of the evidence and make more subjective judgments. At
best, this lack of precision in resolving evidentiary issues weakens the
credibility of the statement. At worst, it may result in a statement which
records the most commonly accepted issues - results on which
achieving consensus is easy - while failing to include specific guidance
on the controversial points the conference was held to resolve. The 1992
conference on laparoscopic cholecystectomy illustrates the latter
outcome; the consensus statement endorses a procedure that is largely
safe when performed by a competent surgeon but omits guidance to
patients or policy-makers on selecting a competent surgeon during the
current period of initial rapid diffusion. Nor did the statement address
the complications associated with the procedure.
Strengthening the Consensus Development Process.
Comparing the Science Court model and the NIH consensus
development process suggests several areas of potential improvement in
the latter. The NIH program should consider broadening the focus of its
consensus development process from practice guideline development
and technology transfer to include specific federal issues of health
policy. The program would also benefit from opening its issue selection
process to members of the intended audience of the consensus findings,
including national health authorities, industry, payers, and other agents
to help ensure that consensus conferences concentrate on areas of
practice most in need of change. These parties also should participate in
identifying conference participants, particularly panelists, and contribute
to the definition of questions to be answered by the conference.
The program should expand its scope beyond safety and efficacy to
issues of cost and related economic concerns, quality of life, ethical and
legal concerns, medical necessity, and others as appropriate to the topic
being debated. For all these issues, special efforts need to be made to
obtain the best information available and systematically synthesize and
4 RISK - Issues in Health & Safety 133 [Spring 1993]

order the data before the beginning of the consensus conference,
borrowing from the goals of the Science Court process for presenting
and challenging evidence. This synthesis could employ meta-analytic or
decision theoretic modeling of available data. 9 The planning effort
should result in an organized compilation of points to be addressed at
the conference, far enough in advance of the conference to afford
participants time for a thorough review. Such advance preparation
would better equip panelists for their role in evaluating presentations and
developing useful guidance. The sponsoring organization should
provide for peer review of the consensus statement to ensure that the
questions posed to the panel were adequately addressed and that the
findings were reasonably supported by the evidence. These
recommendations have been made to the NIH program by the Institute
of Medicine and others in the past but have not been adopted. 10
Conclusion
The time may have come to transfer some of the responsibility for
health technology assessment to an agency with a broader role than the
NIH in this area. One likely candidate would be the Agency for Health
Care Policy and Research (AHCPR). Congress established the AHCPR
in 1989 as a sister agency to the NIH in the Public Health Service.
AHCPR's authorizing legislation directs the agency to "conduct and
support specific assessments of health care technologies." 1 1 This
legislation specifically charges the agency with considering not only
safety, efficacy, and effectiveness, but, "as appropriate, costeffectiveness, legal, social, and ethical implications, and appropriate
uses of such technologies." Alternatively, other government or private
organizations could fill this role; to a limited extent, some already do.
Whether NIH expands its current narrowly focused technology
assessment program alone or in collaboration with other organizations,
or allows the baton to be passed, hopefully the principles of the Science
Court experiment will influence future participants in this process to
produce more effective guidance for health care decision making.

9 Itzhak Jacoby & Stephen G. Pauker, Technology Assessment in Health Care:
GroupProcessand Decision Theory, 22 ISRAEL J. MED. SCL 183 (1986).
10 INSIT'n OF MEDICINE, CoNsENsus DEVELOPMENT AT THE NIH: IMPROVING THE

PROGRAM (1990).
11 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, P.L. 101-239.

